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To date, nuclear arms control has focused on restricting the
number and capabilities of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles—
intercontinental missiles and bombers. In the future, it will
become increasingly important to combine these measures with
restrictions on nuclear warhead and fissile-material stockpiles
and on the operation and targeting of nuclear forces. Restrictions
on nuclear warheads, materials, operations, and targeting would
not only help improve stability, but would also help reduce the
risk of accidental, unauthorized, or erroneous use of nuclear
weapons. A major challenge is verifying compliance with such
restrictions. This paper outlines the technical possibilities for
verifying limits on stockpiles of warheads and fissile materials,
on the dismantling of nuclear warheads and the disposition of
fissile materials, and on the launch-readiness of nuclear forces in
the hope of stimulating further research on these topics.
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Introduction
The last decade has seen great progress in nuclear arms control between the
United States and the former Soviet Union. The INF Treaty eliminated all ground-
launched weapons with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The START I
Treaty cut in half the number of strategic warheads deployed by the superpowers,
from nearly 25,000 in 1989 to about 13,000 in 1998.1 The START II Treaty, which
has not yet been ratified by Russia, promises to cut these arsenals in half again, to a
combined total of less than 7,000 deployed strategic warheads. In addition, both
countries have agreed to reduce the number of nonstrategic nuclear weapons,
although these commitments are informal and not subject to verification.
These reductions, while certainly welcome, are not enough. The risks posed by
nuclear weapons would remain unacceptably high even after the full
implementation of START II. These risks are of several types. First, there is the
risk that leaders of the nuclear weapon states might intentionally use or threaten to
use nuclear weapons in a crisis. Second, there is the risk of accidental,
unauthorized, or erroneous use of such weapons. Third, there is the risk that the
current arms control regime could break down, freezing arsenals at high levels or
triggering a renewed arms race. Fourth, there is the risk that additional countries
might acquire nuclear weapons, either through theft or diversion or as a result of a
more general weakening of the nonproliferation regime.
Faced with these risks, and in the absence of hostility between the nuclear
powers, some former civilian and military leaders have called for a general
prohibition on nuclear weapons.2 As a practical matter, this is premature.
Prohibition will not be possible until relations among the major powers—in
particular, Russia, China, and the major NATO countries—are more like current
relations among the United States, the United Kingdom, and France.3
                                        
1 Robert S. Norris and Thomas B. Cochran, US–USSR/Russian Strategic Offensive Nuclear Forces: 1945–1996
(Washington, DC: Natural Resources Defense Council, January 1997); Robert S. Norris and William M. Arkin,
“Nuclear Notebook,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 54, No. 1 (January/February 1998), p. 71; Robert S.
Norris and William M. Arkin, “Nuclear Notebook,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 54, No. 2 (March/April
1998), p. 71.
2 See, for example, Craig Cerniello, “Retired Generals Re-ignite Debate Over Abolition of Nuclear Weapons,” Arms
Control Today, Vol. 26, No. 9 (November/December 1996), p. 14-15, 18.
3 For a more detailed discussion, see National Academy of Sciences, Committee on International Security and Arms
Control, The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1997),
http://www.nap.edu/readingroom/books/fun; and Steve Fetter, “Verifying Nuclear Disarmament” (Washington, DC:
Henry L. Stimson Center, Occasional Paper No. 29, October 1996), http://www.stimson.org/pdf/fetter.pdf.
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In the meantime, we can reduce the risks posed by nuclear weapons through
properly designed and implemented arms control measures, and simultaneously
prepare the foundation for much deeper reductions in the number of weapons,
perhaps all the way down to zero. These measures should include:
• verified reductions in the total number of nuclear warheads, including
nondeployed and nonstrategic warheads, and in stockpiles of weapon-usable
fissile materials;
• reductions in the readiness of nuclear forces, and corresponding increases in
the warning time of an attack;
• a shift away from counterforce strategies and targeting doctrines; and
• a robust firebreak between theater and strategic-capable missile defense
systems.
Each of these arms control measures raises new verification challenges, which are
reviewed below.
Reductions in Warheads
To date, nuclear arms control has focused on restricting the number and
capabilities of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles—intercontinental missiles and
bombers. The number of nuclear warheads mounted on deployed strategic delivery
vehicles is subject to verification under START II, but the numbers of nonstrategic
or nondeployed warheads are not limited by any agreement. Although limits on
delivery vehicles and launchers will remain of central importance, it will be
increasingly important to complement these with controls on all nuclear warheads.
This is recognized is the March 1997 Joint Statement of Presidents Clinton and
Yeltsin issued in Helsinki, which calls for a START-III agreement that includes
“measures relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories and
the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads…to promote the irreversibility of
deep reductions including prevention of a rapid increase in the number of
warheads.” The Presidents also agreed to “explore, as separate issues, possible
measures relating to…tactical nuclear systems, to include appropriate confidence-
building and transparency measures,” and to “consider the issues related to
transparency in nuclear materials.”
Agreed limits on nuclear-warhead and fissile-material stockpiles, together with
associated transparency and verification measures, would have several benefits:
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• First, they would build confidence in each side’s understanding of the size of
the other’s stockpiles of nuclear weapons and fissile materials, and the rate
of reduction in these stockpiles.
• Second, they would build confidence that the nuclear arms reductions being
carried out are irreversible, and that the potential for rapid and large-scale
breakout from agreed limitations is very low.
• Third, they would build confidence that nuclear weapons and fissile
materials are secure from theft or unauthorized use, and provide information
needed to strengthen mutual cooperation toward that end.
• Finally, such measures would build political support for ratifying and
implementing the START agreements, would lay the foundation for deeper
reductions in nuclear arsenals; and would strengthen the nonproliferation
regime by demonstrating a commitment to further nuclear arms reductions.
A comprehensive transparency regime would have several components,
including initial declarations and exchanges of information, baseline inspections to
gain confidence in the accuracy and completeness of the declarations, and
inspections to verify the dismantling of warheads and the ultimate disposition of
warhead components.
Declarations.  We should begin with a comprehensive declaration or exchange
of data on the location, status, type, and serial number of every nuclear device that
exists.4 The location of a warhead would be a particular storage bunker or delivery
vehicle. The status would indicate whether the warhead is in the active or reserve
inventory or whether it is slated for dismantling and, if so, when. If steps had been
taken to render the warhead unusable, such as removing tritium, batteries, or other
components, this could be indicated as well. The serial number could serve as a tag
for the warhead, or special tags could be developed and applied for this purpose.
The declaration would be updated at agreed intervals—every six months or so.
Declarations would be valuable even without transparency measures. Early
declarations would build confidence and would stimulate both governments to
ensure that their accountancy systems are accurate and understandable. In the case
                                        
4 In June 1995, the United States proposed a modest stockpile data exchange agreement, which called for
exchanging data, on a confidential basis, on total current inventories of nuclear weapons and fissile materials, as
well as the total number of nuclear weapons dismantled each year since 1980, and the type and amount of fissile
material produced each year since 1970. Unfortunately, Russia rejected the proposal as “too comprehensive.”
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of historical information, such as the rates of production of nuclear weapons or
fissile materials, it is important to assemble this information today, while the
personnel who were involved and in charge of these operations are still available.
Baseline inspections.  But the real value in declarations would come with their
verification, and the second element of a transparency regime would be baseline
inspections to verify the accuracy of the declaration. Since deployed strategic
warheads are covered by START and all tactical warheads are in storage, the
baseline inspections would mostly involve verifying the number of nonstrategic
and nondeployed warheads in storage bunkers.
Inspectors could visit a particular bunker on short notice and verify that the
declared number of warheads is present—no more, no less. Alternatively,
inspectors could randomly select a small number of warheads for inspection and
verify that the serial numbers on the warheads matched those listed in the
declaration. Sampling can greatly reduce the number of warheads that are
examined. For example, if a random sample of 20 or 30 warheads turned up no
undeclared warheads, then one could be highly confident that significant numbers
of undeclared warheads do not exist at that site.5
There are, however, two key problems in verifying a warhead declaration. The
first is knowing that an object which is declared to be a warhead of a particular
type really is a warhead of that type. This could be dealt with by developing
“fingerprints” or templates of warhead types, and using random sampling to verify
that a particular warhead is an authentic warhead of the declared type. For
example, Russia could present one or more SS-18 warheads for fingerprinting, or
warheads could be selected from a deployed missile by U.S. inspectors. A set of
agreed characteristics could be measured: length and diameter; mass; the relative
strength of neutron emissions or gamma-ray emissions; or heat output. A signature
of this type could be extremely difficult to spoof.6 If such measurements would
                                        
5 Let f be the fraction of warheads at the site that are undeclared, n be the number of warheads sampled, and P be the
probability that at least one of the sampled warhead is undeclared (i.e., a violation is detected). If the total number of
warheads at the site is much larger than n, then P = 1 – (1– f)n. If f = 0.1and n = 30, then P = (1 – 0.930) = 0.96. In
other words, if 10 percent of the warheads at a site are undeclared, then it is highly likely (about nineteen chances in
twenty) that a random sample of 30 warheads would contain an undeclared warhead.
If the total number of warheads at the site is not much larger than the number sampled, the probability of
detecting a violation is much higher. Let N be the total number of warheads from which the sample of n is drawn,
and M = fN be the total number of undeclared warheads; then P = 1 – (N–M)!(N–n)!/(N–M–n)!N!. For example, if
N = 100 and f and n are as above (0.1 and 30, respectively), then P = 1 – 90!70!/60!100! = 0.977.
6 To appreciate the detail and complexity of a high-resolution gamma-ray signature, see Steve Fetter, Thomas B.
Cochran, Lee Grodzins, Harvey Lynch, and Martin S. Zucker, “Gamma-ray Measurements of a Soviet Cruise-
Missile Warhead,” Science, Vol. 248 (18 May 1990), pp. 828-834.
- 6 -
reveal sensitive weapon-design information, an automated system could be devised
to give a simple “yes” or “no” answer to the question, “Is this an SS-18 warhead?”7
A second, more severe, problem in verifying declarations is knowing that they
are complete. How could the United States and Russia be confident that the other
had not hidden a few hundred or even a few thousand warheads? Warheads are so
small and inconspicuous that we can never be absolutely sure that there are no
hidden warheads. We can, however, substantially reduce uncertainties and, over
time, develop confidence in the declaration.
Challenge or anytime-anywhere inspections are often mentioned as one way to
detect undeclared warheads, if they exist. This does not seem very promising,
however, because a well-designed plan to hide warheads would give few clues
about where to look. A better approach would be to exchange historical
information on the nuclear stockpiles as part of the initial declaration. For example,
we could exchange information on the history of every nuclear device ever
manufactured, including the dates and locations of assembly and disassembly and
movement between various storage and deployment facilities. In addition, data
could be exchanged on the production of fissile materials and warhead
components, and on the location, design, and operation of facilities involved in the
production of warheads and fissile materials.8 These records could be examined for
internal consistency, for consistency with the stockpile declaration, and for
consistency with archived intelligence data.
In some cases, on-site inspections might be able to confirm the accuracy of the
declaration. For example, measurements of isotope ratios in the permanent
structural components of plutonium-production reactors and in depleted uranium
tailings, could be used to verify declarations of plutonium and HEU production.9
                                        
7 The CIVET (“Controlled Intrusiveness Verification Technology”) system, developed at Brookhaven National
Laboratory, accomplishes this task with a high-resolution gamma-ray detector and a special-purpose computer
without permanent memory.
8 Indigenous production of nuclear warheads involves numerous steps, including: (1) the mining and refining of
uranium ore; (2) the fabrication of uranium fuel and targets for plutonium-production reactors; (3) the operation of
these reactors; (4) spent-fuel reprocessing, plutonium purification, and storage of high-level wastes; (5) fabrication
of plutonium pits; (6) warhead assembly; (7) warhead storage, deployment, and maintenance; (8) warhead
dismantling. In principle, data could be collected on these and other steps, and these data could be examined in
detail to verify its internal consistency, and its consistency with other information.
9 Steve Fetter, “Nuclear Archaeology: Verifying Declarations of Fissile-material Production,” Science and Global
Security, Vol. 3, Nos. 3-4 (1992); T.W. Wood, D.C. Gerlach, B.D. Reid, and W.C. Morgan, “Feasibility of Isotopic
Measurements: Graphite Isotopic Ratio Method (Richland, WA: Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, April
1994), unpublished manuscript.
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Using one technique, the total amount of plutonium produced by a graphite reactor
can be verified with an accuracy of about 5 percent.10
Uncertainties in the completeness of the declaration cannot be eliminated, but
current uncertainties could be reduced substantially. Unclassified U.S. government
estimates of the number of warheads in the Russian stockpile are said to uncertain
by plus or minus 5,000 warheads, and former Minister of Atomic Energy
Mikhailov has been quoted as giving widely divergent estimates for the size of
Russian warhead and fissile-material stockpiles.11 Unless these uncertainties are
reduced through a program of declarations and transparency measures, it may be
difficult to sustain a cooperative program to reduce the risks posed by nuclear
weapons.
Dismantling.  If we can establish a baseline inventory of nuclear warheads, we
can proceed to verifiably dismantle them. There are three main methods for
verifying the dismantling of warheads.12 The first is to verify that a nuclear
warhead had been removed from the stockpile, and that the corresponding nuclear
components—in particular, the plutonium pit—had been placed in a monitored
storage facility. For example, Russia could verify that a U.S. warhead had been
removed from the storage area at Pantex, and that some days later a pit had been
placed in the storage area. The “fingerprinting” procedures mentioned earlier could
be used to assure that the object to be dismantled was an authentic warhead of a
given type, and that the object which is subsequently placed in storage was an
authentic pit. It may be possible to verify that the pit was taken from a certain type
of warhead (by comparing the radiation signatures of the warhead and pit), or from
a particular warhead (by irradiating the warhead with a burst of neutrons and
measuring the fission-product gamma-ray signature of the pit some days later).
Again, sampling could be used to minimize the number of warheads or pits that
would be subjected to detailed examination.
A second method would be perimeter-portal monitoring at the dismantling
facility. The portal would be equipped with a system to detect and verify the
                                        
10 B.D. Reid, Dave Gerlach, Pat Heasler, Jim Livingston, “Trawsfynydd Plutonium Estimate” (Richland, WA:
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, September 1997), p. 100. Five percent refers to one standard error.
11 In 1992, the CIA estimated that Russia had 30,000 nuclear weapons, “plus or minus 5,000.” (See “Testimony of
Lawrence Gershwin before the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee,” 6 May 1992.) Subsequent statements
by Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Victor Mikhailov that the Russian stockpile peaked at 45,000 warheads cast
doubt on the CIA estimate, and emphasized further the difficulty of estimating warhead stockpiles with national
intelligence alone.
12 These are reviewed in Department of Energy, Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Transparency and
Verification Options: An Initial Analysis of Approaches for Monitoring Warhead Dismantlement (Washington,
DC: U.S. Department of Energy, 19 May 1997).
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authenticity of warheads entering the facility, and to detect fissile materials exiting
the facility. Components containing plutonium or uranium would be stored
pending their ultimate disposition under mutual monitoring; other components
could be destroyed or recycled, as agreed by the parties.13
A third method would track the warhead and its components through the
dismantling process. Although this is often considered to be excessively intrusive,
it may be possible to protect sensitive information. The monitoring party could, for
example, track the movement of warhead up to the disassembly cell, track the
movement of the fissile components from the disassembly cell to the storage area,
and verify that the disassembly cell contained no warheads or warhead components
both before and after the disassembly procedure. Monitoring could be done by on-
site inspectors, or remotely using secure video links or radio beacons.
Disposition.  The final component of a warhead transparency regime would be
the disposition of the warhead components. The goal is to render the materials in
these components at least as unavailable or unattractive for use in future nuclear
weapon production as materials which are commonly available in the civilian
nuclear fuel cycle, such as low-enriched uranium or spent reactor fuel. In the case
of high-enriched uranium, transparency measures have already been negotiated to
verify that material from dismantled warheads is being converted into low-
enriched uranium for civilian reactor fuel. Disposing of plutonium components will
be more difficult.14 The plutonium could be used to fabricate mixed-oxide fuel
elements for civilian reactors, but the resulting fuel would be more expensive than
fresh uranium fuel, and neither country has facilities to fabricate plutonium fuels.
Alternatively, the plutonium could be mixed with vitrified high-level radioactive
                                        
13 A possible complication is the fact that warhead maintenance and remanufacturing activities might still be
occurring at the facility. To deal with this, it might be best to segregate these activities. For example, Pantex could
designate a certain area for maintenance and remanufacturing, and another area for dismantling. It would be
necessary, of course, to verify that the maintenance facility wasn’t being used to increase the stockpile, but this
could be done by requiring a strict balance between the number of warheads and pits entering and exiting the
maintenance facility. Some people worry that, by observing maintenance and remanufacturing activities, the
monitoring party might learn of vulnerabilities in the force. If, for example, Russia observed that all the W-76
Trident warheads were being rebuilt, it might conclude that that system had a major reliability problem. Even so, it
is difficult to see how that knowledge would confer a significant and usable military advantage. U.S. policy is to
maintain a mix of warheads in the stockpile, so that the failure of any one system would not cripple the deterrent
capability of the overall force.
14 For a comprehensive discussion, see National Academy of Sciences, Committee on International Security and
Arms Control, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium (Washington, DC: National Academy
Press, 1994); and National Academy of Sciences, Committee on International Security and Arms Control,
Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium: Reactor-Related Options (Washington, DC:
National Academy Press, 1995).
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wastes. In either case, traditional IAEA-type safeguards should be able to verify
that no plutonium has been diverted.
Reduction in Readiness
Despite the end of the Cold War, the United States and Russia continue to
maintain thousands of nuclear weapons on alert, ready to be launched within a few
minutes of an order to do so. During the Cold War, both sides believed that the
ability to launch nuclear forces quickly was a necessary and appropriate hedge
against the possibility of a surprise attack against its nuclear forces. This was true
despite that fact that both sides maintained—and still maintain—substantial forces
that cannot be destroyed by a surprise attack.
The balance of risks has shifted decisively against such a posture in recent
years. The fear of calculated attack by the Soviet Union has been superceded by a
risk of accidental, unauthorized, or erroneous attack by Russia. Russia, to protect
against the possibility of a sudden attack involving the thousands of U.S. warheads
maintained on high alert, reportedly relies on its capacity to launch its ICBMs and
pier-side SLBMs on warning of a missile attack. But Russia’s attack warning
system is seriously fragmented and degraded: only three of its nine modern radars
are working at all, seven of the ten older “Hen House” radars lie outside Russian
territory, and two of the nine slots in its constellation of early warning satellites are
empty.15 The dangers of this hair-trigger posture were illustrated when the launch
of a harmless Norwegian scientific rocket triggered the first-ever activation of
Yeltsin’s “nuclear briefcase.”16
Maintaining nuclear forces on high alert is difficult and dangerous enough in
the best of conditions, but Russia is in the midst of a extended political and
economic crisis that could worsen rapidly. Within the armed services, wages go
unpaid for months, morale is low and corruption is high, and facility maintenance
and personnel training are deferred. On several occasions electrical power has been
cut off to strategic nuclear facilities because bills were not paid, and
                                        
15 Bruce G. Blair, “De-alerting Strategic Nuclear Forces,” in Bruce Blair, Jonathan Dean, Harold Feiveson, Steve
Fetter, James Goodby, George Lewis, Janne Nolan, Theodore Postol, and Frank von Hippel, The Nuclear Turning
Point: A Blueprint for Deep Cuts and Dealerting of Nuclear Weapons (Washington, DC: The Brookings
Institution, 1998).
16 Bruce G. Blair, Harold A. Feiveson, and Frank N. von Hippel, “Taking Nuclear Weapons off Hair-Trigger Alert,”
Scientific American (November 1997), pp. 74-76.
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communications have been disrupted because thieves were “mining” cables for
valuable metals.17
The stain on both countries would be relieved if neither had to worry about the
possibility of instant nuclear attack. The United States and Russia took a step in
this direction by removing nuclear weapons from bombers, but more must be done.
The launch-readiness of nuclear forces should be reduced in ways that are readily
transparent to the other side, so that both sides can be assured that a large-scale
surprise attack is not possible. Care must be taken, however, to do this in ways that
do not create advantages—real or perceived—for quickly realerting forces or for
striking first in a crisis.
In the near term, these goals could largely be achieved by maintaining a
survivable force no larger than that required to fulfill the core deterrent mission,
and by taking all other forces off alert. The core mission could be fulfilled by two
to four submarines at sea, each armed with 50 to 100 warheads. These submarines
need not—and should not—be capable of firing their missiles on short notice, but
it might be difficult to demonstrate this to other countries without compromising
their survivability. All other forces could be rendered incapable of rapid launch in
ways that would be readily verifiable. For example, bombers could be based away
from nuclear weapon storage areas. For ICBMs or in-port SLBMs, one could
remove a key component, such as the shroud, guidance system, or warheads. For
silo-based ICBMs, one also could obstruct or disable the silo door. Inspectors or
remote monitoring devices could verify that missiles and bombers had not been
readied for launch, and could provide timely warning of any attempt to do so.
The longer-term challenge is to verify that all delivery systems—even subs and
mobile missiles on patrol—are incapable of being used quickly, without
compromising their survivability or their ability to fulfill the core deterrent
mission. It has been suggested, for example, that U.S. subs could patrol out of
range of targets in Russia, but this would require that Russia be able to verify, on a
more-or-less continuous basis, and in crisis as well as in peacetime, that U.S. subs
had not moved within range. Although technical schemes can be envisioned that
would make this possible—for example, requesting a particular sub to surface
within a certain amount of time—it is likely that they would be resisted by the U.S.
navy. Also, unlike U.S. subs, Russian subs normally do not patrol the open oceans,
and doing so might compromise their survivability. Another concept relies on
removing a key component, such as the guidance system, from the missiles aboard
                                        
17 Blair, “De-alerting Strategic Nuclear Forces.”
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the submarines. But how would Russia know at all times that the component had
not been reinstalled? Similar questions arise with land-mobile ICBMs. This is an
area where creative technical thinking is needed.
As a related confidence-building measure, the United States and Russia should
adopt cooperative practices to assure each other that neither has launched or is
preparing to launch a nuclear attack. Today, verification of alert status and warning
of attack are provided solely by national technical means, such as
photoreconnaissance and attack-warning satellites and early-warning radars. All
five nuclear weapons states could gain from an evolving program to share such
intelligence with each other, or to install sensors (video cameras, seismic sensors,
and the like) near the nuclear forces of other states to verify their status. A program
to exchange military officers also would enhance confidence over time in the low
alert rate and benign intentions of the other countries.
Shift in Strategy
Despite the end of the Cold War, there is ample evidence that the United States
and Russia cling to nuclear doctrines that emphasize early strikes on nuclear and
command and control targets and attacks directed at the political and military
leadership. A policy of targeting opposing nuclear forces for rapid destruction puts
pressure on the other side to stand ready to launch its vulnerable forces
(particularly ICBMs) on a few minutes notice, before these forces could be
destroyed by a sudden attack. Fear of such attacks could trigger a launch of nuclear
forces in response to a false warning, or a massive response to a small accidental or
unauthorized attack.
A doctrine that provides for the rapid launch of nuclear forces during peacetime
simply cannot be justified today, when the probability of an accidental or
inadvertent launch may be far greater than the probability of a deliberate nuclear
attack. Even an option to launch under attack is unwise, because it forces political
and military leaders to make momentous decisions in a few minutes with very
incomplete information on the nature or origin of the attack.
The United States and Russia should adopt strategies that would not call for
prompt attacks on counterforce targets or imperil major fractions of the nation’s
population. Target planning might instead focus on major military facilities or core
infrastructure such as energy network nodes located outside large urban areas. In
all cases, plans should be designed to minimize civilian casualties, to reduce the
pressure or incentives for escalation, and to allow political leaders to negotiate an
end to nuclear attacks.
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It is difficult to imagine how changes in targeting could be verified. War plans
are carefully guarded secrets, and changes in them can at best be verified indirectly
through corresponding changes in force posture. A dialogue between U.S. and
Russian military leaders on this subject, combined with an expanded program of
officer exchanges, could help pave the way toward greater mutual understanding.
Demarcation of Defense
A strong linkage exists between reductions in the size and readiness of
offensive nuclear forces and limits on missile defenses. This linkage was captured
in the preamble to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, in which the United
States and the Soviet Union agreed that
 Effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would be a substantial
factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a
decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons [and] . . .
would contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for further
negotiations on limiting strategic arms.18
U.S. plans to develop and deploy systems capable of providing even a limited
defense of the U.S. territory could weaken and possibly destroy the value of the
ABM treaty. The Cold War may be over, but the United States and Russia will not
agree to reduce their nuclear forces unless they are confident that the residual force
could fulfill the core deterrent mission. If the United States deploys a system
capable of intercepting missiles, Russia will take steps to ensure that its forces
could penetrate the system. These steps could include refusing to implement
provisions of the START agreements, increasing the number of deployed
warheads, or increasing the readiness of its ICBMs and pier-side SLBMs to launch
on warning of an attack. China’s small missile force would be more vulnerable to a
missile defense, and it too might take steps to increase its offensive potential if the
U.S. deployed a missile defense. It is precisely this sort of action-reaction
syndrome that the ABM Treaty was designed to prevent.
Proponents of missile defense in the United States often point to the possibility
of attacks by so-called “rogue” nations, such as North Korea or Iran. But current
and foreseeable threats from these quarters are so limited that they do not justify
deploying systems that would be capable of destroying Russian or Chinese
missiles. In view of the limited nature of the missile threat, deployments of
                                        
18 U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories
of Negotiations (Washington, DC: U.S. ACDA, 1990), p. 157.
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defensive systems should take place only if all the nuclear powers agree, at least
tacitly, that such systems would not interfere with cooperative efforts to reduce the
size and readiness of their nuclear forces. Otherwise, such deployments could be
counterproductive, leading to a net decrease in security and stability.
Various technical constraints on missile-defense systems have been proposed to
create a firebreak between tactical and strategic-capable defenses. Limits on the
speed of interceptors or test warheads, intercept altitude, the number and
geographical distribution of interceptors, sensor technology and integration, and
the sale of technology to third parties should be investigated. Again, this is an area
that is ripe for new and creative thinking.
Conclusion: Technical Challenges in Verification
Because this is an audience of physicists, I’ll conclude with a summary of the
technical challenges for arms control verification that lie ahead.
• Nuclear archeology: how can one verify that a country has produced a
certain number of nuclear weapons or a certain amount of high-enriched
uranium or plutonium?
• Fingerprinting: how can one verify that a warhead or pit is authentic without
revealing details about its construction?
• Dealerting: how can one verifying that a missile is incapable of firing
without revealing its location or otherwise making it vulnerable to attack?
• Strategy: how can one verify that a country no longer plans to target its
missiles against the nuclear forces and command and control systems of
other countries?
• Demarcation: how can one verify that theater missile defense system do not
pose a threat to the strategic missile forces of other countries?
Each of these challenges could benefit from creative and original thinking, and I
hope that some of you will be stimulated try. Thank you.
